pharmacological remedies for transsexualism, numerous transsexuals have sought, and seek, a surgical solution. Dissatisfaction with one's anatomic sex need no longer be, it seems, an irremediable source of psychic pain. With a bit of hormonal and surgical wizardry, doctors can now bring individuals to a phenotypic resemblance to the anatomic sex of their choice. Man may look as woman; woman as man.
That medical art can now produce these counterfeit phenotypes raises a variety of philosophically puzzling issues. In this paper I wish to explore two of these issues.
First, I believe that transsexualism focuses attention on deep issues having to do with one's 'real' sex. Bluntly, what is it? So far I have mentioned anatomic sex and alluded to the sex people conceive themselves to be, or gender. But I am interested in whether there is some fact about human beings which constitutes their real sex.
Secondly, I wish to explore how a stand on the first issue shapes beliefs about the moral permissibility of sexual reassignment surgery (hereafter SRS).
Unfortunately, the depth of these two issues may be obscured if SRS is immediately assimilated to ordinary cosmetic surgery. It is simply too facile to defend SRS by observing that just as some individuals are dissatisfied with their physiognomy, so are some dissatisfied with their sexual anatomy. And since no deep philosophical issues arise in connection with the production of counterfeit faces, none arise in connection with the production of counterfeit genitalia. Of course common sense marshals doubts about the comparability of routine cosmetic surgery to SRS. Doctors and laymen readily understand the motivation for undergoing run-of-the-mill cosmetic surgery. Aquiline noses are generally preferred to bulbous ones. The social benefits of looking good are well known. And besides, surgery seems to be able to alter the actual size of noses in a way that surgery cannot alter actual sex. Nor, in the case of routine cosmetic surgery, do physicians attempt to justify surgery by claiming that the operation will bring the patient to a closer resemblance to an underlying psychological reality. A fanciful case might help to make these reflections clearer.
II
Suppose that a patient requests that a doctor amputate his hand (3)? The doctor balks. The patient persists. His request, he explains, arises from a persistent and longstanding dissatisfaction with his two-handedness. For 
IV
Despite the intuitive plausibility of making the criteria of sex psychological, there is a Humean line of argument against it.
Asserting that one's Sex is a matter of psychological perception could mean one of three things. First, that there is a particular and unique kinaesthetic sensation for each Sex; secondly, that there is a simple perception of masculinity or femininity when identifying one's Sex; thirdly, that there is some complex perception of masculinity or feminity when identifying one's Sex.
The first position is unsatisfactory. If a kinaesthetic sensation enables identification of Sex, transsexuals must attend to some biological part possessed by one Sex and not the other. But transsexuals do not claim to possess such a part. They grant they are anatomically as the opposite sex. Hence they have not the right parts to notice.
The idea that the correct test for Sex lies in a simple perception of masculinity or feminity founders on the inability to characterise the perception. I, for example, am unable to discern any simple perception of my Sex, unless I return to a perception of my physical parts, which amounts to a retreat to the kinaesthetic reading of perception that has already been rejected.
The third alternative claims the psychological perception of Sex to be complex. Presumably, this means that there is some constellation of psychological facts to which persons attend when identifying their Sex. If so, psychologists should be able to develop reliable and valid tests for detecting the presence of a masculine or feminine constellation. Psychiatrists working with transsexuals do in a sense attempt to do this. Typically, it is discovered that transsexuals prefer activities stereotypically associated with the other sex. Male transsexuals report a preference for sewing, cooking, and other 'womanly' chores, females for 'manly' pursuits like bowling and topless bathing. But to make the psychological perception of Sex a matter of noticing that one has a certain pattern of preferences confuses one's Sex with one's preferred role. Who doubts that men might prefer the social status of women and vice versa? Preferences, however, do not plausibly determine what Sex we are. The present suggestion would cause a person's Sex to vary if his or her preference constellations reversed. Moreover, the present preference test for Sex would have as its consequence that transsexuals could obtain an indisputably successful Sex change by moving to a society in which the Sex they wish to be has the preferences that they presently have and looks as the transsexual looks without SRS.
The failure ofpsychological perception as the test for Sex entails the rejection of the transsexual's contention that SRS prevents others from making a mistake about the transsexual's Sex. An accurate description of what SRS accomplishes seems to be this: an individual who has the natural phenotypic appearance of one Sex and has the socially acquired stereotypic preferences of the other Sex is given a phenotypic appearance commonly thought to be congruent with those preferences. In the light of our preceding discussion, some important differences between SRS and the amputation case can be noted. First, the swap and transformation cases clarify why someone might wish to have a phenotypic appearance other than he or she has. Changed appearance, in some instances, may be enabling. If Sally is transformed into an M-body, Sally's ability to enjoy, to take one example, the style of intercourse she prefers disappears. SRS would enable Sally to engage in sex acts otherwise unattainable. Second, and similarly, many other roles which, whether rightly or wrongly, are closed to her in the absence of SRS, would be after SRS reopened. 
or her own sexuality. In short, masculinity and feminity, as matters of personal concern, are socially created roles with tenuous ties to biology. No analogous social roles exist for the one-or two-handed. Since an individual's phenotypic appearance, whatever his or her Sex may be, can be essential for occupying a role, it is indeed rational for individuals to wish to occupy the only role in which they feel comfortable.
The rationality of SRS for some individuals undermines the claim that the surgery is mutilating. Hence the first objection, that SRS is mutilating, has been met. The If the foregoing is correct, a person's Sex should have no moral significance. No one, in the ordinary flow of events, knows what Sex he or she is. At best persons form reasonable conjectures about their Sex, for to know their Sex would require that they know that they possess an essence which has yet to be discovered. That nobody knows his or her Sex can provide a defence against the charge that SRS deceives.
A defence of the claim that nobody knows who is of what Sex needs one more bit of evidence to be plausible. In addition to testicular feminisation syndrome, there is a rare syndrome in which there are 'males' who are 44+XX. For individuals who are engaging in a sexual relationship, there is invariably a slight possibility that their partner is not ofthe Sex they reasonably believe their partner to be. To know what Sex a partner is, the knower would have to make an inquiry into his or her partner's genetic structure. Of course people will say that it is so improbable that their partner is not of the Sex that they believe them to be that they do know their partner's Sex. They are wrong. If I buy a Canadian lotto ticket, I say that I know that I will not win. I do not, however, know that I will not win. If I knew that I would not win, the purchase of the ticket would be inexplicable. What I know is that my chances of winning are very, very slight. Despite the odds, I hope that I will win. This lottery parallels knowledge about the Sex of a partner. Nor will it do to object that the lottery case is dysanalogous to the Sex determination case on the ground that an individual's sexual phenotype is typically a causal product of a sexual genotype. There is but a finite probability of the genotype receiving a typical phenotypic expression. Were I asked to wager on a person's Sex, I should wager if a bookie offered me favourable odds. Suppose I did wager. To what facts would the bookie and I appeal to settle? Not the phenotypic facts, for they are not disputed. Rather, a presently unknown fact would settle the question. The situation is similar to that during the Olympic games, where it is not assumed that those who look like women are women.
People may claim to know, but without having investigated the relevant biological data, no knowledge is to be had. But why should that matter? Intuitively, it seems the sexual differences that concern people are at the surface. Whatever a person's sexual preferences, the preferences are apparently stimulated and sustained by readily observable factors of the partner. People seem to care not about the sexual essence of a person, but about whatever surface features make it reasonable to suppose the individual is of the Sex desired. It is these surface features which carry the moral and practical weight.
The Still, the immediate response will surely be that although SRS does not make people generally more likely to make mistakes about an individual's Sex, SRS does make people more likely to make mistakes about the Sex of particular individuals. Prior to SRS, the transexual's Sex will, in all probability, be correctly identified. After surgery, accurate identification of Sex is unlikely. By increasing the likelihood of misidentification of particular persons as male or female, SRS deceives.
To undermine this argument, I should point out that the case of John and Sally placed the morally significant aspects regarding sexual relations at the surface. Sally's male Sex had no moral significance for John. What presumably matters is that Sally should look as John wishes his love to look and that Sally's personality should be such as John loves. SRS will undoubtedly make some people more likely to fall in love with the transsexual. But the love will focus on the features precisely relevant to love. The surface features which are morally relevant the transsexual will have. For the man loving a transsexual who has undergone SRS, his partner will be as phenotypically female as Sally is to John. There is no doubt that the man would not have loved his partner ifthe phenotypic appearance was what one would have expected given the genotype, but the same is true of John and Sally. Although SRS intentionally brought about the present appearance of the transsexual while no intentional change occurred in Sally's appearance, the change being intentional does not, in itself, mean deception is involved.
If people do care about the Sex of their partner, they may always ask. Lying about not having had SRS would be deceptive, just as lying about not having had rhinoplasty would be deceptive. There are plenty of facts about people which would bother their relations if discovered, but revealing them is no duty and asking about them may well be impertinence. When one remembers that the fear underlying the question is that one cannot tell another's Sex without asking, the suspicion arises that it is morally invidious concerns which motivate the question. Why should an essence determinable only by specialists influence a choice with which a person is otherwise, if left to his or her own means, perfectly content to make on the basis of personal observations? In daily life, people show not the slightest concern for the deep biology of their associates. History may undoubtedly make one loved more or less, but failure to proclaim one's history is not evidence of deception. A 
